Over the past two decades, increasing awareness of the personal suffering and societal burden produced by mood disorders has prompted unprecedented interest in these illnesses. Hence, advances have been made in our understanding of mood disorders.
of mood disorders are thus confounded by two features of modern psychiatry.
The first is the reification of depression and bipolar disorder by reliance on circular definitions. Patients must meet specific criteria in order to be labelled as having a mood disorder and patients who don't meet these criteria are excluded from studies used to characterise the disorders. Thus, the results of research inevitably "confirm" that the criterion symptoms are prevalent in those with the mood disorder, and reify the diagnosis. This is in stark contrast to early psychiatric practice where a descriptive approach was taken, and the concepts of depression and mania-and their co-occurrence-was generated from real-world observations, and definitions of these concepts reflected the illness in its "natural" state.
The second is the widespread prescription of "mood" medications, such that samples of drug-naïve patients in research are extraordinarily rare. As a result, it is difficult to separate symptoms that genuinely stem from the underlying illness from those that are a possible consequence of treatment. 14, 15 To some extent, this problem may be overcome by examining early descriptions of mood disorders, prior to the advent of modern pharmacotherapy, where symptoms were not obscured or modified by the effects of medications.
| Historical accounts
Although melancholia had been recorded for millennia, and the ancient Greeks had noticed that melancholia often appeared in patients who also experienced "exalted" states, 16 it wasn't until the latter half of the 19th century (when physicians first started to take a proper interest in psychiatry) that the foundations of the modern definitions of bipolar disorder and depression were laid. The first generation of specialised psychiatrists followed a descriptive method, based on the approach of the French physician Phillipe Pinel, whose aim was "to notice successively every fact, without any further object than that of collecting materials for future use." 17 Consequently, the understanding of mood disorders grew, and specific syndromes with distinct clinical pictures were identified and described. It is important to note that the majority of early observations took place in asylums and, as such, did not always include patients in the community who were suffering from milder forms of mood disorders.
Pinel was succeeded by Esquirol, whose rich descriptions of the known psychiatric illnesses remain remarkably familiar nearly two centuries on ( Figure 1 ). In his textbook, Esquirol endeavoured to distinguish lypemania (from traditional descriptions of melancholia) and monomania (from mania), as "partial" insanities that were less severe, 18 but it was his student Falret, while engaging in a famous rivalry with the then-renowned Baillarger, who arguably laid the foundations for the precursor to modern bipolar disorder.
Through their disputations, captured in seminal lectures, Falret and Baillanger described an illness marked by "a perpetual circle of depression and manic excitement interrupted by a period of lucidity." Falret emphasised that the "clinical course" was the key to diagnosing this illness. 19 It is important to note, because it is pertinent to our later discussion, that in all cases depression and mania were considered more than a disorder of mood, and that some psychiatrists considered mood to be secondary to disturbances in cognition and activity.
Key developments to Falret and Baillarger's conceptualisations came with Kahlbaum and Hecker's descriptions of cyclothymia.
Building on the principles laid down by Pinel, Esquirol, and Falret, Kahlbaum popularised the use of a descriptive and longitudinal approach to nosology in Germany-"using if possible all the initial expressions of individual patients… assessing the entire course of the disease." 20 By following this method, Kahlbaum identified mood, intellect, and behaviour as the principal domains impacted by psychiatric illnesses, and differentiated dysthymia (chronic depression), hyperthymia (the equivalent of today's mania), and cyclothymia (a cyclic course of his dysthymia and hyperthymia) a . He noted that mild cases of cyclothymia were common, and considered hyperthymia and dysthymia to share a common characteristic of "emotional irritation." His student, Hecker, noted that cyclothymia begins at a "youthful age," is "to be attributed to hereditary causes" and that, in the depressive phase, there is "a really surprising tendency towards suicide," 21 and described precursors to the modern concept of rapid cycling (see Figure 1 ).
Kahlbaum's descriptive and longitudinal approach to nosology was also used by Kraepelin in his descriptions of psychiatric illnesses. 22 Kraepelin's ideas underwent many revisions as he gained knowledge from his own practice and through the work of others, and it was in the sixth edition of his classic textbook that he was able to present a unified concept of manic depressive insanity. In this, Kraepelin encapsulated the previously separate syndromes of depression, mania, and cyclothymia into one entity that was distinguished fundamentally by recurrence. 22 Kraepelin observed that the polarity, frequency, and severity of episodes varied between patients but also within patients, and therefore none of these features could be used to reliably partition distinct diseases.
Here, Kraepelin was noticeably influenced by Weygandt's innovative work highlighting the prevalence of mixed states and classifying the various types of mixed state presentations. 23 Through his work, Weygandt noted that the "excitation" of mania did not always affect mood, activity, and cognition at once, and that some domains could in fact be inhibited as in depression (and vice versa).
Indeed, two thirds of patients seen across 7 years at Kraepelin's Heidelberg Psychiatric Clinic in the 1890s experienced these mixed states, 23 and this widespread coupling of manic and depressive symptoms led to Kraepelin's view that mania and depression were two faces of one illness. Nevertheless, he noted that individual subtypes may become evident and could be characterised in the future. Interestingly, even at these very early stages where diagnostic concepts were still somewhat nebulous and yet to take form, Kraepelin specifically kept "psychogenic depression," that was regarded as having foundations in adverse life events and was not inherently recurrent, separate from manic-depressive insanity.
a Kahlbaum is most famously remembered for providing early descriptions of catatonia, a subtype of depression characterised by a seeming paralysis of movement and speech.
Perhaps the most fundamental feature of early approaches to psychiatry is a longitudinal perspective. Traditional psychiatrists developed their understanding through close examination of the course of an illness across a patient's lifespan. 24 In this way, recurrence was seen as a key feature of the illness that we now call bipolar disorder and major depression ( Figure 2) ; and single episodes of depression in response to a stressful life event were considered to be a separate malady. Over the years, diminishing emphasis has been placed on adopting a longitudinal perspective and, because of this, the data needed to confidently support or refute the significance of recurrence has not been collected.
When assessing patients, psychiatrists of old were less concerned with diagnosis per se. Rather than trying to fit patients into a pre-existing set of criteria, they used detailed descriptive (catamnestic) approaches in which they comprehensively characterised the symptom profiles of patients as they presented. This approach revealed that mixed states were far more common than our current thinking has led us to believe, and that domains other than mood feature prominently in these illnesses. Indeed, entire chapters in books of the time were often devoted to physical symptoms, and changes in cognition and activity were seen as on par with changes in mood. This suggests that our present obsession with mood is misguided, and that pure mania and depression are relatively uncommon, such that they should not be accorded such prominence in diagnostic manuals. This is an important point that warrants careful consideration and, although our data is once again limited in this regard, recent research does lend support to both the traditional perspectives of mixed state prevalence and the importance of cognition and activity domains.
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| The development of a common, reliable language
The richness of historical observations of mood disorders has largely been forgotten, and modern psychiatric definitions have increasingly focused on reliability-arguably at the cost of validity. Currently, Figure 3 for an overview).
The demand for a classificatory system for mental illnesses emerged during the 1800s, and several physicians endeavoured to invent their own nosologies during this era, though none gained traction. In 1880, the USA census aimed to understand the preva- The history of DSM reveals that it has been susceptible to influence from prevailing theories-an inevitability of application in clinical practice-and that it is vulnerable to political and social influences. In DSM-I, 29 psychoanalytic theory made its appearance through use of the word "reaction," which purported that syndromes were caused by psychosocial stressors. Hence, the primary mood disorder was described as a manic-depressive reaction, In practice, a major criticism of DSM-II was that it lacked reliability. Indeed, inter-clinician reliability was barely above chance.
In addition, the changing landscape brought about by the advent of psychiatric medications and the resultant need to be able to effectively research the effects of emerging drugs on psychiatric syndromes caused the focus of nosology to shift from providing a common clinical language for communication between physicians to the development of operationalised diagnostic criteria for methodologically sound research. Thus, the emphasis of DSM-III 33 shifted dramatically towards reliability and reproducibility.
Major critics of the DSM-II were the Washington University group, who generated the Feighner Criteria to classify psychiatric illnesses. 34 The criteria were explicitly aimed at improving communication between researchers, and concerned only the diagnoses that were reasonably well-validated by the evidence available at the time.
Specifically, they only included diagnoses that they regarded as valid on the basis of having sufficient laboratory findings, delimitation from other disorders, or evidence from family and follow-up studies. As a consequence, although clinical descriptions of many more psychiatric syndromes existed, only 14 disorders were included in the diagnostic criteria, and these included the primary affective disorders-mania and depression. In addition, Feighner and colleagues acknowledged "atypical" psychosis with affective symptoms, and also considered a diagnosis of secondary depression, to capture depressive symptoms that occur in the context of a pre-existing, nonaffective psychiatric illness or severe medical illness.
Their efforts were well received and informed the development of the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC), 35 which ultimately brought about a paradigm shift that eventuated in DSM-III. The RDC F I G U R E 2 Natural course of manic-depressive illness (3 R's). Longitudinal observations from the era prior to psychopharmacology and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) provide three key insights: the coupling of distinct episodes of depression and mania constitutes a distinct Recognizable illness (manic depressive illness); mood disorders are inherently Recurrent by nature; and disturbances of mood (episodes) generally Remit of their own accord (spontaneously). Note, the average time between recurrences is 18 months, and episodes of illness generally last for 2-8 months 68 essentially expanded upon the Feighner Criteria and were mostly concerned with reliability, which meant that validity suffered. One of the reasons for this is that the criteria were intended to be used mainly for confirmation of diagnoses to aide communication, especially between researchers. Indeed, the authors were explicit in their focus on facilitating research, and acknowledged that they had excluded symptoms that were difficult to assess reliably. Some diagnoses included in the RDC were based primarily on clinical experience, not research findings, and the authors chose categories and definitions that they deemed most useful for research purposes.
These decisions were justified at the time and helped to refine the perspective of mood disorders considerably. Yet, there has been a lack of revision and many of these aspects prevail to this day, despite no justification of their validity.
First, the RDC did not attach sufficient importance to longitudinal evaluations, and instead considered cross-sectional examination to be sufficient, such that diagnosis focused almost exclusively on the present episode of illness. with those that were recurrent. Essentially, "major depressive disorder" came to encompass all previously identified forms of depression.
The RDC also dispensed with mixed state terminology, though still acknowledged the existence of some common mixed presentations in their subtypes.
Criticisms of the RDC's validity emerged soon after its publication. However, as a "manifesto" designed to promote research, it was fulfilling its purpose. Problems arose when DSM-III promoted several of the RDC's diagnoses into clinical nosology, as well as adding several key changes of its own. DSM-III incorporated manic disorder under bipolar disorder, included bipolar II as an example of atypical bipolar disorder but not a separate diagnosis, and, ignoring the categorical approach espoused at the time by the Newcastle Group in the UK, 38 included only two subtypes of major depression (single episode and recurrent -more than one episode) with only two specifiers (with psychotic features -either mood congruent or incongruent, and with melancholia). 33 Notably, mixed presentations were displaced from depression entirely, and were relocated as a subtype of bipolar disorder, where full manic and depressive criteria had to be present to acquire the label. Perhaps the biggest change of this edition of DSM was that situational/reactive depression was subsumed under the same category as recurrent depression, which had previously been considered two separate illness processes. 39 That is, although the idea that unipolar and bipolar were separate disorders had been proposed some decades earlier, it was the recurrent forms of the disorders that were conceptualised in this way -situational depression had until this point been seen as distinct from episodic depression. This decidedly changed with DSM-III. Of note, DSM-III was deliberately atheoretical due to a lack of etiological evidence for psychiatric disorders at the time. The authors made it a goal for future editions to include information on pathogenesis-a goal that is yet to be achieved.
The primary issue with DSM-III was that it made sweeping changes based on the opinions of North American experts in the 1980s and the little evidence available at the time. Although not necessarily an issue in itself, the ultra-conservative approach to subsequent editions has meant that DSM-IV and DSM-5 have remained heavily influenced by the decisions made in 1980. In response to some of the criticisms of DSM-III, DSM-IV 40 added several specifiers for mood disorders, recognising once again the occurrence of catatonia in depression. However, DSM-IV also made mistakes of its own; for example, reifying bipolar II disorder, 41 despite concerns regarding its validity as a distinct entity from bipolar I. 42 This remains unchanged in DSM-5, 43 which has revisited mixed states and introduced the mixed features specifier to more closely reflect the presentations seen clinically. But here too some spurious judgements have been made as to which symptoms should be included 44 and, as such, the true nature and proportion of patients described as "mixed" remains unknown.
Ultimately, however, the current nosology has not changed considerably since 1980. Furthermore, the modern-day pressures of making a quick diagnosis has meant that the value of longitudinal evaluation has been relegated to history and is no longer valued.
Consequently, the lack of specificity of symptoms in DSM 
| Limitations of the current perspective

| Research aspects
The limitations of the prevailing diagnostic systems means that the extant data (and that being garnered through current research) is also limited. The problems are three-fold: firstly, research inevitably favours those disorders listed in DSM, and this means diagnoses that are not included or have been poorly defined (such as mixed states) are not being adequately investigated. Secondly, because the diagnoses in DSM guide research questions, the findings from research conducted on these categories inevitably reify DSM diagnoses. This is exemplified by the oft cited argument that there are "real" differences between bipolar I and bipolar II, eg in impairment and suicidality, but this is simply a consequence of the fact that dividing a group of bipolar patients based on the severity of their manic symptoms will generate subgroups that are different. These differences cannot then be used to support the notion that distinct illness processes are at play and that the differences are meaningful-especially when the cut-offs employed between the groups are wholly arbitrary. 45, 46 Third, varied symptom presentations have been subsumed into the same category, so that research is conducted on heterogeneous groups, rather than specific subtypes (as originally envisioned by the creators of the RDC, for example). While these problems are now being acknowledged to some extent by investigators worldwide, they are yet to attract the research efforts needed to resolve them.
In addition to limitations founded on diagnostic issues, the complexities of real-world patients further brings into question the quality of current data. "Natural" presentations of mood disorders are now rarely seen in research, because patients are typically medicated early in the course of their illness and are often described as having comorbid psychiatric problems (eg anxiety, when in fact some degree of anxiety is perhaps part of depression and mania 47 ). Furthermore, the nature of research unavoidably excludes certain types of patients, such that clinical trials are usually performed on a small subset of those suffering from mood disorders. As a result, research "findings" are severely restricted in their generalisability and, predictably, the response rates observed in RCTs are rarely replicated in real-world settings .
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| Clinical aspects
Amongst the many manifestations of mood disorders, a number of clinical complexities are inadequately explained by current models and have led to diagnostic misalignment in clinical practice. Both unipolar and bipolar mood disorders are recurrent by nature-somewhere between 25% and 75% of patients with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) experience recurrences throughout the course of their illness. 48 Recurrence is therefore a key feature of mood disorders, but one that is accorded insufficient weighting by current classifications. This can be remedied relatively simply by adopting a longitudinal perspective when assessing and diagnosing mood disorders.
The second problem is the primacy and importance given to polarity, which is fundamentally incompatible with mixed states. Indeed, the mere existence of mixed states, which are commonly encountered in clinical practice and have been ever since manic-depressive illness was first described, 49 challenges the "bipolar" model. To accommodate mixed states properly, it is necessary to concede that the current model is, at the very least, incomplete, if not totally incorrect. To understand and overcome this problem, it is useful to deconstruct the various syndromes of mood disorders and regroup the constituent symptoms into domains (see further -ACE model). In doing so, it becomes apparent that the symptoms that commonly occur in mood disorders can be grouped meaningfully according to activity, cognition, and emotion (see Figure 4) .
The third problem is that depression in the context of unipolar major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder is no different.
However, the presence of episodes of depression with mania (creating bipolar disorder) has separate features and characteristics than when only depression occurs. For example, unipolar depression (MDD as defined in DSM-5) is twice as common in women as in men, whereas depression paired with mania in the same individual (bipolar disorder as defined in DSM-5) is equally prevalent across the two genders. And yet, recurrent unipolar depression, which currently falls within MDD, is more akin to bipolar disorder and does not seem to have a gender bias. 50 To better understand the unipolar-bipolar spectrum, it is advantageous to regard the processes that lead to depressive and manic syndromes as multi-faceted, with some common elements that are shared and perhaps even linked, whilst others operate independently and are possibly even subject to separate causative factors. This last conundrum deserves in-depth examination but would require a detailed discussion that is far beyond the scope of the present paper. However, it's important to note that the approach needed to solve this third problem is similar to that required to resolve the other difficulties with the clinical features of mood disorders (recurrence and polarity) and that the model proposed in this paper holds for all three of these problems.
| THE ACE MODEL
The symptoms that commonly present in mood disorders, rather than being clustered as clinical syndromes, can be grouped according to functional domains. This grouping is perhaps more useful and also reflects more accurately their nature, relatedness, and intrinsic properties. The three principal domains are activity, cognition, and emotion.
To fully appreciate the relationship between these domains and how they subsume the symptoms typical of depression, the three broad domains can be conceptualised as the primary colours of light -green, blue, and red (see Figure 4) . Within each domain, individual symptoms can be thought of as different shades of particular colours and, just as some secondary colours are composites of primary colours, so too can symptoms be regarded as either primary or secondary. This may be important aetiologically, with those symptoms that are primary perhaps being more closely associated with underlying pathophysiology.
Another important aspect to note is that each symptom is dimensional with respect to severity, and can range from non-pathological to featuring prominently and manifesting as a dominant characteristic. This can perhaps be equated to brightness, ie the intensity of light.
Conceptualising the symptoms that contribute to mood disorders in this manner allows us to consider more nuanced aspects of clinical presentations that may give us novel insights into their underlying pathophysiology. Adopting this perspective also explains, to some extent, the complexity of depression in clinical practice, where many gradations and myriad combinations of symptoms commonly manifest.
At first pass, this more elaborate model makes matters more complicated, and so it is important to examine what additional benefits it provides, especially as regards facilitating research and enhancing our understanding of clinical mood disorders.
| Mixed states
The current DSM model of two principal, pristine presentations (mania and depression) with only slight variations and changes in emphasis giving rise to subtypes, fails to fully capture clinical reality where, as discussed, seemingly disparate symptoms from opposite poles commonly co-occur. By grouping the commonly observed clinical symptoms of mood disorders more naturally into functional domains, a number of markedly contrasting symptoms can coexist, allowing for a more accurate reflection of clinical experience. For example, in the ACE model, extreme sadness (an emotional symptom) can be considered alongside distractibility (a cognitive symptom) and agitation (an activity symptom) without having to forcibly assign a predominant "mood state" (ie depression or mania). Applying this approach systematically to mixed states allows for six additional presentations alongside "pure" depression and mania, and each of these can then be further F I G U R E 4 Symptom domains: Activity, Cognition and Emotion. (A) In an individual with mood disorders, the complex clinical picture changes over time with different domains manifesting primacy and thereby altering the presentation. Global severity (y-axis and black dotted lines) is the sum of individual symptoms, which in this figure have been grouped according to functional domains so as to demonstrate how the impact of individual domains (and by extension symptoms) can vary, sometimes contrasting against the overall pattern of change. Activity is shown in green, cognition in blue, and emotion in red. For example, symptoms within the emotional domain make the most significant contribution at point A, whereas cognitive symptoms are the key drivers at time point B. It also worth noting that activity contributes throughout and that, although this varies only modestly in comparison to cognition and emotion, when tracked from the beginning of the graph to the end it gradually shifts from being the least impactful to the most. It is important to note that emotion is a broader term than mood, which subsumes symptoms such as suicidal thinking (which, despite being regarded as an emotional symptom also has significant cognitive components). Furthermore, use of the term emotion to describe the domain avoids confusion with the diagnostic descriptor, 'mood' disorders. (B) The three domains (Activity, Cognition and Emotion) can be conceptualised as operating in different planes. For clarity, the domains have been depicted as being separate but in actuality they interact and overlap. Attention, for example, is at the core of emotional experiences and can drive activity. Emotions are powerful encoders of memory, and activity often alters mood and triggers thinking. Symptoms are driven by factors that operate in these separate planes and are therefore, in essence, independent. However, even symptoms that almost exclusively belong to a single domain inevitably manifest components of other domains (perhaps as they take form and are expressed) and therefore, in reality, the majority of symptoms are composites, made up of components from all three domains, with variable contributions from each. The variability of these components means that symptoms are multifaceted and forever changing. Individual symptoms can also straddle domains and in some instances shift to some extent from one domain to another over time. A key feature of this model is that it provides a clearer understanding of the relationship between the three domains in relation to the genesis of symptoms and allows symptoms to be considered with greater granularity along a number of dimensions. Finally, though this model adequately depicts the juxtaposition of the three domains relative to each other, it is important to note that it does not capture the chronology of mood disorders, shown both in Figure 4 (A) and Figure 6 . (C) The symptoms (shown as circles of different sizes reflecting their severity) from within the three domains contribute to the myriad variations of mood disorders. The coloured circles (symptoms) fall within a domain (eg blue circle within cognition) or overlap across a number of domains (pink circle intersects all three domains) and symptoms together form the syndromes that form the basis of mood disorders. Collectively these fluctuate in terms of severity over time impacting overall functioning (see also Figure 6 ) nuanced by subtle variations within each domain and fluctuations in individual symptoms, approximating more precisely to clinical reality. 51 The additional mixed states can be represented schematically as shown in Figure 5 .
A significant advantage of the ACE model is that it accommodates mixed states, and this is important because of their prevalence in clinical practice. 52 However, it also provides a possible explanation as to why mixed states typically have a poor response to treatment. Currently, the management of mood disorders using pharmacotherapy focuses primarily on treating symptoms related to mood (those within the emotional domain). Consequently, symptoms within other domains (cognition and activity) are accorded less importance, both when considering diagnosis and treatment, and some treatments may even produce or exacerbate such symptoms -in effect creating a mixed state. 53 In reality, symptoms are not confined to the "poles" of the emotional domain-namely depression and mania-and in practice any number of symptoms from different domains can (and do) occur. The fact that multiple domains are affected suggests that the underlying pathology of mood disorders is diverse, and therefore treatments that solely target the mood domain are only capable of treating some of the symptoms, whilst the majority (in cognition and activity domains) will remain unchecked. Clinically, this results in seeming non-response or at best a poor partial response.
Examining the occurrence of symptoms and their response to treatment using a broader model with more specific components should F I G U R E 5 Mixed states modelled according to symptom domains. "Pure" mania (white) and depression (black) can be considered as extreme activation and inhibition, respectively, in all three domains of activity (green axis) cognition (blue axis), and emotion (red axis). When the pattern of activation and inhibition is asynchronous in any of the domains, this gives rise to admixtures of symptoms that present as mixed states. This sphere thus represents the spectrum of mood disorder presentations according to variance in the domains of activity, cognition, and emotion. Here, each state has been given the traditional labels used by Weygandt and Kraepelin: Unproductive mania (yellow)-activated mood and activity and inhibited thought; Manic stupor (red)-activated mood and inhibited thought and activity; Inhibited mania (magenta)-activated mood and thought and inhibited activity; Agitated depression (green) -inhibited mood and thought and activated activity; Depressive mania (cyan) -inhibited mood and activated thought and activity; Depression with flight of ideas (blue)-inhibited mood and activity and activated thought provide a more accurate clinical picture and a better understanding of pathophysiology and treatment approaches. However, this is not new.
Historically, mixed states were an integral part of Kraepelin's original conceptualisation of manic-depressive insanity 23 and formed a fundamental component of mood disorders. 54 In essence, we are returning to the beginning -linking what we know now about brain biology to what we knew then based on clinical experience.
| Chronology
Consideration of the domains separately also allows us to map each of them longitudinally, and this should allow us to further appreciate the individual characteristics of each symptom over time ( Figure 6 ). Clinically, some symptoms appear spontaneously whilst others have a more insidious onset, some may be iatrogenic, and often different symptoms have different rates of response to treatment over time. This is important for a number of reasons. For example, understanding changes within which domains of symptoms are more likely to result in the emergence of illness or relapse would aid strategies for prompt intervention and possible prevention. 55 Thus, understanding the chronology of symptoms, or at least symptom domains, is of immediate clinical importance.
| Recurrence
A key feature of mood disorders that has been emphasised previously is that of recurrence. The deconstructed model of syndromes, and more logical grouping of symptoms around domains, also facilitates the investigation of the mechanisms related to recurrence.
Recurrence is extremely common in mood disorders -indeed it
is the norm-and yet it is unclear how individuals suffering from depression recover (often spontaneously and occasionally very abruptly). Equally importantly is how, even after functional improvement and so-called recovery, individuals remain vulnerable to further relapses/recurrences. From research efforts to date, it is known that life events play a significant role in precipitating recurrence 56 and that even medications can trigger both "highs" and "lows." [57] [58] [59] Furthermore, in some individuals, there is a periodicity (or seasonality) to recurrence that sometimes seems impervious to treatment. Understanding these more complex aspects of mood disorders clearly requires a longer term and more sophisticated perspective that can be provided by longitudinal studies and the adoption of a model that is not predicated on current diagnostic thinking.
A more refined and granular framework that maps individual symptoms longitudinally is likely to reveal those symptoms that specifically drive recurrence -initiating its onset and governing response.
F I G U R E 6
Chronological differential of symptoms within domains. This figure depicts the differences in onset and offset of symptoms with respect to time. It illustrates potential differences in latency between symptoms from different domains, demonstrating that even within an episode of illness the clinical picture can vary considerably depending on when an individual is assessed. Differential latency is also important with respect to treatment response because, often in clinical practice, certain symptoms improve promptly whilst others take much longer to resolve. This likely reflects differential pathophysiology -in particular, differences amongst the domains in terms of mechanisms, and clinically it means that certain treatments are likely to be better for specific kinds of mood disorders and subtypes. In this particular illustration it is interesting to note that the onset and offset of symptoms maintain their relationships to one another with activity preceding cognition and emotion when the episode begins but then improving prior to the both of them, which in turn resolve in the same order
| FUTURE D IREC TI ON S AND APPLI C ATI ON S OF THE MODEL
In his 1854 essay, Falret eloquently sums up the predicament facing the classification of mental disorders as being "in the age of Tournefort and Linnaeus, and we are waiting for a Jussieu". b More than a century and a half later, it is frustrating to realise that our wait is not over. Despite great advances in technology, we do not have irrefutable diagnoses, and our methods of diagnosing and treating still lack precision and efficacy. This of course is partly due to the complexity of mental illnesses; but we cannot excuse the lack of clinical impact of our investigative endeavours. If we maintain our current perspective on psychiatric disorders and continue to ask the same old questions, it is unlikely that we will achieve any meaningful advances or find any new solutions.
Therefore, it is essential that alongside our current neurobiological focus we revive our original descriptive approach and inculcate a more longitudinal perspective into our clinical practice and research study designs. Practically, this means recording the full extent of symptoms experienced by patients with mood disorders without undue bias towards one domain (presently, emotion). To achieve this, rating scales will need to be revised, and new scales will need to be developed to accurately capture the dimensions of activity, cognition, and emotion. Such prospective research can be informed by re-examining extant datasets (for example performing symptom-specific analyses of clinical data), which may reveal treatment effects or changes in neurobiological profiles missed/ overwhelmed by current analyses focussing on mood. This may require, and will lend itself to, individual patient data analysis. Future clinical trials should aim to incorporate more frequent and detailed longitudinal assessments, especially when investigating treatment effects, and attempt to tease apart with greater granularity the temporal sequence in which symptoms within the various domains lead to relapse. By examining changes along a number of domains and doing so dimensionally, both the positive and negative effects of medications can be charted more accurately.
| Recommendations
• Clinical research assessments of mood disorders should map activity, cognition, and emotion -assigning equal importance to all three domains.
• Rating scales should be re-designed to capture symptoms across all three domains of activity, cognition and emotion and ideally provide subscores in each area.
• The longitudinal course of the illness should be carefully charted, including the age of onset (first episode) and the number, polarity, and duration of episodes.
• The natural history of symptoms of the current episode should be mapped (along with the timing of medications).
• Assessments should all be completed at the same time(s) of day, so as to minimise confounds due to diurnal symptom changes.
• It is imperative that anxiety and personality factors are detected and accounted for so that mood disorder symptoms are accurately measured (see Box 1).
• Throughout the history of mood disorders, the extent to which personality is thought to contribute has waxed and waned 65 -for example, cyclothymic disorder was once called cyclothymic personality and, presently, affective instability is thought to be a core feature of borderline personality disorder. However, mood disorders are best considered independently of personality, whilst at the same time investigators and clinicians should remain cognisant of the potential for personality factors to influence and confound mood disorder presentations. 66 Kraepelin is perhaps most well-known for his definitive separation of manic-depressive insanity and dementia praecox-modern schizophrenia. 24 Although controversy remains about whether schizophrenia is truly distinct from bipolar disorder with psychotic features, 67 or psychotic depression, it does seem that psychosis is best regarded as a separate dimension.
Primarily, the psychotic phenomena present in manic and depressive episodes are most often mood congruent, such that they reflect the individual's affective state (eg delusional beliefs of poverty or ill-health when depressed, delusions of grandeur and enormous wealth when manic). This is not the case for schizophrenia, where psychotic phenomena are often mood incongruent. Thus, in mood disorders, psychosis can be regarded as a separate dimension that can influence mood, activity, and cognition but is, in essence, largely independent.
| CON CLUS ION
It is important to note that, as researchers, our models of thinking determine our questions, and our questions determine what we find. If we do not question the current nosology but accept it as fact, then there will be no studies of its validity and it will never be refined. 
D I SCLOS U R E S
